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INTRODUCTION

In a decision that received considerable national attention, a
majority of a three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in October of 2001 in United
States v. Emerson' that the Second Amendment of the
Constitution, the fabled "right to bear arms," "protects the right
of individuals, including those not then actually a member of any
militia or engaged in active military service or training, to
The
privately possess and bear their own firearms." 2
significance of the court's rejection of the Second Amendment's
stated link between the bearing of arms and citizen service in a
government militia rests, first, with the ongoing political debate
over the meaning of the Second Amendment, 3 and second, with
the fact that the Emerson majority opinion embraced a view
t Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, State University of New
York at Cortland. Ph.D., Cornell University, 1980. Professor Spitzer is the author
and/or editor of ten books, including The RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (2001) and THE
POLITICS OF GuN CONTROL (3d ed. 2003), and dozens of articles on gun control. He

also edits the book series on "American Constitutionalism" for SUNY Press. In 1998,
he testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, on the meaning of the Second Amendment. The author thanks Saul
Cornell for his suggestions and assistance.
1 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
2

Id. at 260.

3 The genesis and evolution of that debate is found in Robert J. Spitzer, Lost
and Found:Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 349 (2000).
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squarely at odds with Supreme Court and lower federal court
rulings dating back to the nineteenth century.
Both the political and legal importance of this decision was
underscored by the response of the United States Justice
Department (the "Justice Department").
Shortly after the
decision, Attorney General John Ashcroft embraced the views
expressed in Emerson as the policy of the Justice Department
when he sent a memo to all ninety-three United States
Attorneys in November 2001, directing them to adopt the
Emerson court's view as the policy of the Justice Department
and as the law of the United States. 4 This abrupt decision was
made without the usual vetting process that is normally followed
whenever the Justice Department considers a change in policy.
In fact, it was produced by the "political echelon" of the Justice
Department. The Solicitor General's Office was not consulted
nor were career Justice Department attorneys who had specific
authority over the government's position concerning the Second
Amendment. 5
Ashcroft's directive of November 2001 was followed in May
2002 with a more formal embrace of the Fifth Circuit's Emerson
view. In connection with the Emerson petition to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari 6 and in a separate petition in Haney
v. United States,7 Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson filed briefs
on behalf of the government, arguing that the individuals
charged in those two cases had been properly prosecuted and
convicted for their respective gun-related violations.
The
defendant in Haney appealed a conviction on charges of owning
two machine guns in violation of a 1934 federal law on the

4 See Brief for the United States in Opposition at Appendix, Emerson v. United
States, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (No. 01-8780) (Memorandum to all United States
Attorneys from the Office of the Attorney General).
5 Mathew S. Nosanchuk, The Embarrassing Interpretation of the Second
Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 705, 766 (2002) ("[W]hen [Attorney General
Ashcroft] decided last spring to reverse the Justice Department's long-standing
legal opinion on the Second Amendment... he did it in a letter to the National Rifle
Association drafted by a senior advisor. Key Justice Department prosecutors...
were not consulted...." (quoting Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Undaunted As Criticism
Grows, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at Al)).
6 Brief for the United States in Opposition, Emerson (No. 01-8780).
7 Brief for the United States in Opposition, Haney v. United States, 122 S.Ct.
2362 (2002) (No. 01-8272).
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ground that such ownership was protected under the Second
8
Amendment.
In support of the convictions in question, Olson's briefs
contained a footnote stating that the government's current
position on the Second Amendment was that it "more broadly
protects the rights of individuals, including persons who are not
members of any militia or engaged in active military service or
training, to possess and bear their own firearms, subject to
reasonable restrictions."9 One news account observed that critics
were troubled not only by "the policy change" but also by "the
offhand manner in which the administration expressed such a
major policy change, in footnotes in briefs filed without public
announcement. "10
In both instances, the Supreme Court
declined to hear the cases in question, thereby permitting the
convictions to stand without comment and declining to address
the proper interpretation of the Second Amendment."
The purpose of this Article is to examine the core legal basis
of the Fifth Circuit's Emerson decision by scrutinizing its
analysis and assertions regarding Second Amendment case law
and especially its treatment of the most important Second
Amendment case, United States v. Miller.12 This Article will
summarize the existing understanding of the meaning of the
Second Amendment, including a summary of past Supreme
Court and lower federal court rulings. It will analyze the
Emerson decision, especially with regard to its extended
treatment of Miller, earlier Court rulings on the Second
Amendment, and its detailed analysis of the federal
government's brief to the Supreme Court in Miller. In the
process, this Article argues that the Emerson decision offers a
defective analysis which, even in its own terms, fails to support
the new view of the Second Amendment it sought to promote.
Therefore, Emerson offers a poor model not only for other courts
hearing Second Amendment cases but also for policy-makers and

8 Id. at 4.
9 Brief for the United States in Opposition at 19-20 n.3, Emerson (No. 01-8780);
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 5 n.2, Haney (No. 01-8272).
10 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Cases on Right to Bear Arms, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2002, at A24.
11 Emerson v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002); Haney v. United States,
122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
12 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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all those interested in the law, politics, and history of the right to
bear arms.

I.

THE MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

Few parts of the Constitution are invoked as often as the
Second Amendment. Politics aside, the meaning of the Second
Amendment is relatively clear. As the text itself says, "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."1 3 Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote
that the Second Amendment "must be read as though the word
'because' was the opening word,"1 4 as in "[Because] a wellregulated Militia [is] necessary to the security of a free State."
As debate concerning the Second Amendment both preceding
and during the first session of Congress made clear, the
amendment was added to allay the concerns of anti-Federalists
who feared that state sovereignty, and more specifically the
ability of states to meet military emergencies on their own,
would be impinged or neglected by a new federal government
with vast new powers, particularly over the organization and use
5
of military force.'
The Second Amendment embodied the Federalist assurance
that the state militias would be allowed to continue as a viable
military and political supplement to the national army at a time
when military tensions within and between the states ran high,
suspicions of a national standing army persisted, and military
takeovers were the norm in world affairs. Debate concerning
what eventually became the Second Amendment during
Congress's first session dealt entirely with the narrow military
questions of the need to maintain civilian governmental control
over the military, the unreliability of militias as compared with
professional armies, possible threats to liberties from armies
versus militias, and whether to codify the right of conscientious
13 U.S. CONST. amend.
14 Warren Burger, The

II.
Right to BearArms, PARADE, Jan. 14, 1990, at 5.
Is Carl Bogus argues that southern states in particular championed inclusion of
the Second Amendment because they feared that the federal government,
influenced by the northern non-slave states, would decline to make federal troops or
supplies available to suppress much-feared slave revolts. This increased the
southern states' desire to organize and maintain their own state militias. Carl
Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309,
369-75 (1998).
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objectors to opt out of military service (an early version of the
16
amendment included such language).
As several Supreme Court cases 17 and over forty lower
federal court rulings' 8 have held, the Second Amendment
pertains only to citizen service in a government-organized and
regulated militia-what is typically referred to as the collective
or militia-based understanding of the amendment. Further,
militia practices in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries required eligible militiamen to obtain and bring their
own firearms if called into service, 19 as the government generally
lacked the resources to properly arm the militia. 20
The abysmal performance of civilian, also referred to as
unorganized or general, militias in the War of 1812 essentially
ended the government's use of such forces to meet military
emergencies. Millett and Maslowski noted that "[a]fter the War
of 1812 military planners realized that no matter how often
politicians glorified citizen-soldiers... reliance on the common
militia to reinforce the regular Army was chimerical." 2 1 Further,
between 1800 and the 1870s, state militias were subject to "total
abandonment, disorganization, and degeneration."22 Skowronek
16 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 182-84, 198-99 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds.,
1991); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 24, 25, 28, 29 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 46 (James
Madison); ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 15-28 (2001); GARRY
WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL 119-21(1999).
17 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.
535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States. v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1876). The Court acknowledged this line of cases in Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL
ch. 2 (2003) for a full discussion of these cases and the nature of early militias.

18 See infra note 60.

19 This requirement was codified by Congress in the Uniform Militia Act of
1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
20 The power to regulate the militias is specifically granted to Congress by the
Constitution in Article I, section 8.
21 ALLAN R. MILLETT & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A
MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 129 (1984). The authors quote Rep.

Jabez Upham, who observed in 1808 during debate in the House of Representatives,
that reliance on citizen militias "will do very well on paper; it sounds well in the war
speeches on this floor. To talk about every soldier being a citizen, and every citizen
being a soldier, and to declaim that the militia of our country is the bulwark of our
liberty is very captivating. All this will figure to advantage in history. But it will
not do at all in practice." Id.; see also DONALD M. SNOW & DENNIS M. DREW, FROM
LEXINGTON TO DESERT STORM: WAR AND POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

260-72 (1994).
22 Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century:Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 36
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noted, "By the 1840's the militia system envisioned in the early
days of the republic was a dead letter. Universal military
training fell victim to a general lack of interest and
administrative incompetence at both the federal and state
levels."23 The government came to rely on professional military
forces that were expanded in times of emergency by the military
draft. The other type of militia forces, the select or volunteer
militias, were used in the Civil War and colonial times and
became institutionalized and brought under federal military
authority as the National Guard under the Militia Act of 1903.24
The meaning of the Second Amendment is additionally
shaped by the fact that the Court has refused to incorporate the
Second Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike most
of the rest of the Bill of Rights, thereby limiting its relevance
only to federal action. The Second Amendment provides no
protection for personal weapons uses, including hunting,
is
sporting, collecting, or even personal self-protection (the latter
25
covered under criminal law and the common law tradition).
The foregoing account of the Second Amendment has been
challenged in recent years by another view, referred to as the
"individualist" view. 26 Developed mostly in the pages of law
(1989); see also JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 317 (1988);
WILLIAM RIKER, SOLDIERS OF THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ch. 3 (1957).
23 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 315 n.17 (1982).
24 Ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775, 775-80 (1903). The Act stated that the "organized
militia [was] to be known as the National Guard," and was separate from the
"Reserve Militia," also known as the unorganized or general militia; no further
provision for the latter was made in the law. See The National Defense Act, ch. 134,
39 Stat. 166 (1916); MILLETT & MASLOWSKI, supra note 21, at 247-49.
25 SPITZER, supra note 16, at 58-59. That the right to personal self-defense has
existed apart from and independent of the Second Amendment-indeed as a natural
right-has been well understood since at least the nineteenth century. See The
Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Private and Public Defense, 1 CENT. L.J. 285-87
(1874).
26 I decline to use the recently coined term "Standard Modelers" or "Standard
Model" to refer to those who advocate alternate views of the Second Amendment, as
this term implies something standard, orthodox, or historically mainstream about
this point of view, when in fact these assertions are unsupported by the history of
writings on the Second Amendment. This term was coined in 1995 by Glenn H.
Reynolds in A CriticalGuide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 463
(1995). Reynolds and a coauthor infer falsely in a subsequent article, Brandon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller's Tale: A Reply to Yassky, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (2002), that views other than the individualist view have
appeared "[o]nly in recent years," when in fact the reverse is true; the individualist
view dates only to 1960. See Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms: A Study in
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journals, it argues that the Second Amendment protects
personal right to own guns independent of militia service. It
this view which was embraced by the Emerson court. In order
understand the Emerson decision, however, it is essential
examine prior case law.
II.

a
is
to
to

SUPREME COURT RULINGS

The Second Amendment has generated relatively little
constitutional law litigation as compared with other parts of the
Bill of Rights. In a few instances, however, the Supreme Court
has ruled directly on the meaning of this amendment. In the
first case, United States v. Cruikshank,27 Cruikshank and two
other defendants were charged with thirty-two counts of
depriving black citizens of their constitutional rights, including
two counts of depriving them of their right to possess firearms in
violation of the Enforcement Act of 1870. Speaking for the
Court, Chief Justice Waite wrote:
The second and tenth counts are equally defective. The right
there specified is that of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose."
This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in
any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.
The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed;
but this.., means no more than that it shall not be infringed
by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other
JudicialMisinterpretation,2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381, 381 (1960). In contrast, the
collective or militia view long predates the individualist view, both in numerous
court decisions dating back to the nineteenth century, as discussed in this Article,
and also in numerous law journal articles dating back decades. Id. Articles
accepting the collective view published before 1960 include: S.T. Ansell, Legal and
HistoricalAspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471, 474-80 (1917); John BrabnerSmith, FirearmRegulation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 400, 409-412 (1934); Victor
Breen et al., FederalRevenue as a Limitation on State Police Powerand the Right to
Bear Arms-Purpose of Legislation as Affecting Its Validity, 9 J. B. ASS'N KAN. 178,
181-82 (1940); Lucilius A. Emery, The ConstitutionalRight to Keep and Bear Arms,
28 HARv. L. REV. 473, 475-77 (1915); George I. Haight, The Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, 2 BILL RTs. REV. 31, 33-35 (1941); Daniel J. McKenna, The Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, 12 MARQ. L. REV. 138, 145 (1928); The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for
Private and Public Defence, supra note 25; F.B. Weiner, The Militia Clause of the
Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940); William Montague, Case Note, National
FirearmsAct, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 129, 130 (1939); Note, Restrictions on the Right to
Bear Arms: State and Federal Firearms Legislation, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 906
(1950); Recent Decision, 14 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 167, 168-69 (1939). For a list of the
numerous articles taking the same point of view published since 1960, see Spitzer,
supra note 3, at 386-401.
27 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
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effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government .... 28
The Court in this case established two principles which it
and lower federal courts have consistently upheld: first, that the
Second Amendment poses no obstacle to at least some regulation
of firearms, 29 and second, that the Second Amendment is not
"incorporated," meaning that it pertains only to federal power,
not state power-this is what the Court meant when it referred
30
to the Second Amendment not being "infringed by Congress."
Admittedly, the Supreme Court did not begin to incorporate
parts of the first ten amendments until 1897. Yet the Court has
never accepted the idea of incorporating the entire Bill of
Rights, 3 1 and it has never incorporated the Second Amendment
despite numerous opportunities to do so.
Also left
unincorporated up to the present day are the Third Amendment,
the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh
Amendment, the excessive fines and bail clause of the Eighth
32
Amendment, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Ten years after Cruikshank, the Court ruled in Presser v.
Illinois33 that an Illinois law that barred paramilitary
organizations from drilling or parading in cities or towns without
a license from the governor was constitutional and did not
violate the Second Amendment. Herman Presser challenged the
law, partly on Second Amendment grounds, after he was
arrested for marching and drilling his armed fringe group, Lehr
und Wehr Verein, through Chicago streets. In upholding the
Illinois law, the Court reaffirmed the Cruikshank holding that
the Second Amendment did not apply to the states. 34 Speaking
for a unanimous court, Justice Woods also went on to discuss the
relationship between the citizen, the militia, and the government
in paragraphs that explained why the Second Amendment, in
the Court's view, did not protect Presser's actions:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms
constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the
United States as well as of the States, and, in view of this
28 Id. at 553 (emphasis added).
29 Id.
30 Id.

31 DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 398 (1993).
32 Louis FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 428-29 (1999).
33 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
34 See id. at 265-69.
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prerogative... the
States
cannot,
even laying
the
constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the
people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the
United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the
public security, and disable the people from performing their
duty to the general government. But, as already stated, we
think it clear that the sections under consideration do not have
35
this effect.
The Court then went on to ask whether Presser and his
associates had a right to organize with others as a selfproclaimed and armed military organization against state law.
The Court answered "no" since such activity "is not an attribute
of national citizenship. Military organization and military drill
and parade under arms are subjects especially under the control
of the government of every country. They cannot be claimed as a
right independent of law." 36 In other words, militias exist only
as defined and regulated by the state or federal government,
which in Illinois at the time was the 8,000 member Illinois
National Guard, as the Court noted in its decision. To deny the
government the power to define and regulate militias would,
according to the Court, "be to deny the right of the State to
disperse assemblages organized for sedition and treason, and the
right to suppress armed mobs bent on riot and rapine."3 7 Thus,
the Presser case confirmed the understanding that the right to
bear arms came into play only in connection with citizen service
in a militia, as formed and regulated by the government. The
Court emphatically rejected the idea that citizens could create
their own militias, much less that the Second Amendment
protected citizens' rights to own weapons for their own private
purposes.
In 1894, the Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. Texas 38 that a
Texas law "prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons" 39 did
not violate the Second Amendment. Again, the Court held that
the right to bear arms did not apply against the states. In
Patsone v. Pennsylvania,40 the Court implicitly recognized a
state's right to regulate firearms by upholding a statute

37

Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 268.

38

153 U.S. 535 (1894).

35
36

39 Id.
40

232 U.S. 138 (1914).
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prohibiting unnaturalized foreign-born residents from possessing
a shot gun or rifle against a claim that the statute violated the
equal protection clause.
The most important Supreme Court case in this sequence is
United States v. Miller.4 1 The 1939 Miller case was founded on a
challenge to the National Firearms Act of 1934,42 which
regulated the interstate transport of various weapons.
Defendants Jack Miller and Frank Layton were convicted of
transporting an unregistered twelve-gauge sawed-off shotgunhaving a barrel less than eighteen inches long-across state
They challenged the Act's
lines in violation of the Act.
constitutionality by claiming that it violated their Second
Amendment rights and that it represented an improper use of
the federal government's commerce power. The district court
sided with Miller and Layton, holding that the law did indeed
violate the Second Amendment, although Judge Heartsill Ragon
provided no explanation or justification for this conclusion in his
43
very brief opinion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court
ruling and turned the petitioners' Second Amendment claim
aside. The unanimous Court ruled that the federal taxing power
could be used to regulate firearms and that firearm registration
was constitutional, as was the 1934 law. 44 Beyond this, the
Court was unequivocal in saying that the Second Amendment
must be interpreted by its "obvious purpose" of assuring an
effective militia as described in Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution (to which the court referred in its decision).
Speaking for the Court, Justice McReynolds wrote:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession
or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches
in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military

41

307 U.S. 174 (1939).

42

Ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
See United State v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939).
Miller, 307 U.S. at 177, 183.

43

44
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equipment or that its use could contribute to the common
45
defense.
Thus, the Court stated that citizens could only possess a
Second Amendment-based constitutional right to bear arms in
connection with service in a militia. 46 In addition, it affirmed the
constitutional right of the Congress, as well as the states, to
regulate firearms. Most of the rest of the decision is an extended
discussion of the antecedents of the Second Amendment. Justice
McReynolds cited various classic writings, colonial practices,
early state laws, and constitutions to demonstrate the
importance of militias and citizen-armies to early America as the
explanation for the presence and meaning of the Second
47
Amendment.
Critics of this case, on occasion, have taken the wording
quoted above to mean that the Court would protect, under the
Second Amendment, the private ownership of the type of
weapons that do bear some connection with national defense. 48
Such an interpretation is mistaken for two reasons.
First, the Court is stating that private ownership of guns
would only be allowed if that possession was connected with
militia service, regardless of the type of gun. Since the two men
charged with violating the 1934 law obviously did not possess
guns while serving in the military, the government could
prosecute them without running afoul of the Second
Amendment. Further, as the Presser case established, citizens
may not create their own militias; militia service can only occur
through government-organized and regulated militias. 49
Second, to protect the ownership of weapons based on their
military utility alone-ignoring the question of whether
individuals who owned firearms were doing so as part of their
militia service-would justify the private ownership of a vast
array of militarily useful weapons manageable by an individual,
from bazookas and howitzers to tactical nuclear weapons, all of
which are subject to extremely tight government restrictions. No
serious argument can be made that the Second Amendment or
45 Id. at 178.
46

See id.

47 See id. at 179-82.

48 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an
"Underenforced Constitutional Norm," 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy 719, 732-34
(1998).
49 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265-69 (1886).
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the Miller decision protects the right of citizens to possess such
weapons when they are not in actual military service.5 0 Because
the Court's judgment in Miller arose from a challenge to the
National Firearms Act of 1934-from which it drew and quoted
the definition of a sawed-off shotgun-its holding rested on the
failure of Miller and Layton to claim any credible connection to
Second Amendment-based militia activities.
The Second Amendment has received brief mention in two
other, more recent Supreme Court cases.
In Adams v.
Williams,5 1 a case dealing with the search and seizure of a
suspect, Justices Douglas and Marshall commented in their
dissenting opinion that the Second Amendment posed no
obstacle whatsoever to extremely strict gun regulations,
52
including those banning possession of weapons entirely.
Similarly, in Lewis v. United States,5 3 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a 1968 law that barred felons from owning
guns, ruling that the law did not violate the Second
Amendment. 54 In this challenge to the Omnibus Crime Control
& Safe Streets Act of 1968,55 the Court stated that gun
regulations were allowable as long as there was some "rational
basis" 56 for them. In other words, the regulations merely had to
serve some legitimate governmental purpose, and according to
the Court, the 1968 law satisfied this requirement.
This
standard is significant because it is one that is easily met,
especially compared to the higher standard the Court has set for
laws that might conflict with other Bill of Rights freedoms, such
as free speech or free press. In a footnote, Justice Blackmun
wrote:
These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither
based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench
50 Robert Hardaway et al., The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the Second
Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate Over the Right
to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 161 (2002).
51 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
52 Id. at 150-51(Douglas, J., dissenting)
53 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
54 See id. at 65-67 ("This Court has recognized repeatedly that a legislature
constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities far more
fundamental than the possession of a firearm.").
55 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 1202, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (repealed at Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986)).
56 See Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65.
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upon any constitutionally protected liberties.... [Tihe Second
Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm
that does not have "some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"...57
Thus, the Lewis case made clear that the Second
Amendment was not accorded the same importance as other
parts of the Bill of Rights and that the Court viewed the Second
Amendment in the collective/militia sense articulated in Miller.
None of this means that gun ownership is somehow illegal or
unrecognized by the law. As the Supreme Court noted in Staples
v. United States,58 "[Tihere is a long tradition of widespread
lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country." 59
On the other hand, this does not mean, nor did the Court say,
that private firearms ownership is protected by the Second
Amendment. All of the Court's decisions make clear that the
Second Amendment is invoked only in connection with citizen
service in a government organized and regulated militia. None
of these cases endorses, protects, or implies any Second
Amendment-based individual right of citizens to own firearms
for their own uses or purposes.
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
These Supreme Court cases represent an unbroken line to
current Court thinking. Lower federal courts have followed the
Supreme Court's reasoning on the meaning of the Second
Amendment in numerous cases. 60 Challenges to gun regulations
57

Id. at 65 n.8 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).

58 511 U.S. 600 (1994).

59 Id. at 610.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002);
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lewis, 236
F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403 (6th Cir.

2000); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on reh'g
on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d
273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Members of City

Council, 730 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134,
1136 (5th Cir. 1971).
In Burton v. Sills, a New Jersey case appealed to the Supreme Court in 1969, a

challenge to a gun law alleging a violation of the Second Amendment was
"dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812
(1969). Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), handed down in December

2002, offered a Second Amendment analysis as lengthy and detailed as that found
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and related efforts to win a broader interpretation of the Second
Amendment, including efforts to incorporate the Second
Amendment, have been uniformly turned aside. In over forty
cases since Miller, federal courts of appeal "have analyzed the
[Slecond [A]mendment purely in terms of protecting state
militias, rather than individual rights." 61 The Supreme Court
has denied certiorari in over a dozen of these cases, thereby
letting the lower court rulings stand. The inescapable conclusion
is that the Supreme Court considers the matter settled and has
no interest in crowding its docket with cases that merely repeat
62
what has already been decided.
In the most famous of these federal appeals court cases, the
Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of two lower federal
court rulings upholding the constitutionality of a strict gun
control law passed in Morton Grove, Illinois, in 1981.63 The
ordinance banned the ownership of working handguns, except for
peace officers, prison officials, members of the armed forces and
National Guard, and security guards, as long as such possession
was in accordance with their official duties. 64 The ordinance also
exempted antique firearms and possession by licensed gun
collectors.
Residents who owned handguns could actually
continue to own them, but they were required to keep them at a
local gun club instead of in the home.65
Brushing aside the arguments of those opposing the law, the
court of appeals confirmed that possession of handguns by
individuals is not part of the right to keep and bear arms, that
this right pertains only to militia service, that the local law was
a reasonable exercise of police power, and that the Second

in Emerson. It concluded, consistent with the arguments in this Article, that the
collective or militia interpretation was correct and that Emerson's analysis was
wrong. See id. at 60-66.
61 United States v. Nelson, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988).
62 See Peter Linzer, The Meaning of CertiorariDenials, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1227, 1229 (1979) (stating that satisfaction with lower court rulings is at least one
important reason for denials). But see Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997)
("It is well settled that our decision to deny a petition for writ of certiorari does not
in any sense constitute a ruling on the merits of the case in which the writ is
sought.").
63 See Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983).
64 Id. at 264 n. 1.
65 Id.
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Amendment does not apply to the states. 66 Stating the matter
succinctly, the federal appeals court concluded, "Construing [the
language of the Second Amendment] according to its plain
meaning, it seems clear that the right to bear arms is
67
inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia."
These decisions from lower federal courts are consistent
with the little-known fact that, in the twentieth century, no gun
law has ever been declared unconstitutional as a violation of the
Second Amendment. 68 The same is true of nineteenth century
One
decisions, including dozens of state court rulings.6 9
70
exception is Nunn v. State, where a Georgia state court voided
part of a state gun law partly on Second Amendment grounds.
Several observations about the Second Amendment arise
from this discussion. First, the amendment reflected concerns
vital to the country's founders relating to the type of military
force that would defend the country from manifold threats
within and outside its borders, the desire to protect state power
and sovereignty as distinct from that of the federal government,
and the expectation that eligible militiamen would have to bring
their own weapons, given the uncertainty about whether the
government could or would supply adequate arms.
Second, like some other elements of the Constitution, such
as the Third Amendment prohibition against the quartering of
troops in private homes during peacetime, the concerns that
gave rise to the Second Amendment evaporated as reality
changed-that is, as the country turned away from unorganized
or general citizen militias, the Second Amendment was rendered
obsolete. The surviving element of the old militia system-the
organized or volunteer militia-was brought mostly under
federal government control through a series of federal laws
enacted in the early twentieth century. 71 Therefore, government
control of what remained of the old militia system shifted mostly
to the national government. While this arrangement was a
departure from the militia system contemplated by the
Constitution's founders and the authors of the Bill of Rights, it
66

Id. at 270.

67

Id.

See supra note 60.
See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (stating that the Second
Amendment acts as a check only on the power of Congress).
70 1 Ga. 243, 245 (1846).
71 SPITZER, supra note 16, at 28-32.
68

69
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reflected the nation's shifting military priorities and was ruled
72
constitutional by the Supreme Court.
Third, recognizing these new military and political realities,
the Court has not incorporated the Second Amendment, as it has
with most of the Bill of Rights. The consensus of constitutional
law scholars is that the incorporation process is at an end-since
the last incorporation decision was in 1969-with the possible
exception of the fines and bail clause. 73 Thus, even if the Second
Amendment did protect an individual right to bear arms outside
of service in a militia, it would still not restrict the states and so
would not be a right citizens could claim in their daily lives.
Conversely, even if the Court incorporated the Second
Amendment, it would apply only to the old concept of universal
militia service, a practice abandoned before the Civil War. This
brings us to the 2001 decision of the Fifth Circuit in United
74
States v. Emerson.
IV.

THE ANOMALOUS EMERSON CASE

Emerson arose from charges filed against Timothy Joe
Emerson, a Texas doctor indicted for carrying a pistol while
subject to a restraining order issued by a Texas state court.7 5
The fact that Emerson was carrying the gun put him in violation
of a federal law making it a crime for persons subject to domestic
violence restraining orders to possess a firearm. 76 In a ruling
that departed from every related federal case up until that time,
the district court voided the gun-possession ban as a violation of
the Second Amendment. 77
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
unanimously reversed the district court's decision. 78 A twomember majority, consisting of Judges William L. Garwood and
Harold R. DeMoss, Jr., went on, however, to assert that the

72 See Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 340-46 (1990) (detailing history of
national control of militia policy); Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 46-47
(1965) (same).
73 See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF

RIGHTS 279 (1981).
74 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
75 See United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 599 (N.D. Tex. 1999),
rev'd, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 600-12. For discussion and critique of this case, see Hardaway et al.,
supra note 50, at 129-38.
78 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Second Amendment did, in fact, protect individual rights of
citizens to own guns apart from militia service. 79 The third
judge, Robert M. Parker, while concurring in the result, labeled
the majority's interpretation as dicta, irrelevant to the outcome
of the case.8 0 This assertion was strengthened by the obvious
fact that the reputed existence of such a Second Amendment
right bore no connection to the court's judgment sustaining
Emerson's prosecution and repudiating his Second Amendmentbased claim. The Supreme Court refused to hear Emerson's
appeal,8 ' and in October 2002, Emerson was convicted of three
82
counts of unlawful firearms possession.
Even if Judge Parker's concurring opinion is correct-that
the majority's lengthy analysis of the Second Amendment and its
embrace of the individualist view are nothing more than
meaningless
dicta 3-it
nevertheless
warrants
careful
examination, both because the majority offered it as law and
because of its consequences for the political and legal debate over
the meaning of the Second Amendment.
The core of the Fifth Circuit majority's analysis asserting an
individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment arose
from the discussion of possible interpretations of the Second
Amendment, the important 1939 Supreme Court case United
States v. Miller,8 4 the Justice Department's brief in that case,
and other related cases that the court claimed supported its
point of view.85 The subsequent text of the majority opinion
provides an extended discussion of parts of the Second
Amendment itself and a lengthy discussion of history.8 6 The
79

Id. at 260.

80 Id. at 272 (Parker, J., concurring).

Emerson v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 2362 (2002).
San Angelo Man Convicted of Criminal Charges in Second Amendment Case,
ABILENE REP.-NEWS, Oct. 8, 2002, http://www.texnews.com/1998/2002/texas/
texassanangell08.html. (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
83 As one author observed:
Judge Garwood had no need first to conclude that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right in order to hold that Emerson did not have
one. It would have been much easier-and appropriate to the judicial
role-to conclude that under any interpretation of the Second Amendment,
Emerson had no protected right to possess firearms, making it
unnecessary to reach the individual rights claim to decide the case.
Mathew S. Nosanchuk, supra note 5, at 775.
84 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
85 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 203, 218-27.
86 Id. at 227-61.
81

82
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fatal flaws repeated in the historical portions of the majority
decision are thoroughly refuted elsewhere 7 and are less central
to the Emerson outcome than the decision's interpretation and
application of past court rulings. It is this latter analysis that
will be the focus of the balance of this Article.
V.

REINVENTING MILLER

Arguably the single most startling observation to be found in
the Emerson decision is the majority's assertion that United
States v. Miller88 has been consistently and grossly
misunderstood by courts and commentators for over sixty
years.8 9 As Judge Garwood noted repeatedly throughout the
decision, 90 the federal courts have uniformly embraced the
collective interpretation of the Second Amendment as the central
conclusion of Miller. Given the time and space turned over to
consideration of Miller,91 the Emerson majority evidently found
it important, even essential, to argue that Miller in fact
supported the Emerson conclusion despite the Emerson court's
statement that "we do not proceed on the assumption that Miller
actually accepted an individual rights.., interpretation of the
92
Second Amendment."
87 See SAUL CORNELL, WHOSE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS DID THE SECOND
AMENDMENT PROTECT? (2000); SPITZER, supra note 16, at 13-43; Ehrman &

Henigan, supra note 22, at 5; Nosanchuk, supra note 5, at 705. See generally
Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHt.-KENT L.
REV. 291 (2001); Peter Buck Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A
Second Look, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 46 (1966); Paul Finkelman, A Well Regulated
Militia: The Second Amendment in HistoricalPerspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195
(2001); John Levin, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: The Development of the
American Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148 (1971); Jack N. Rakove, The Second
Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000);
Ralph J. Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of ConstitutionalHistory,
16 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 (1967); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed
Citizens:An HistoricalAnalysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
961 (1975).
88 307 U.S. 174 (1939); see supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
89 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227.
90 Id. at 218, 220, 227.
91 Id. at 221-27.
92 Id. at 226-27. Emerson actually posits that there are three views of the
Second Amendment: the collective rights (also militia) view, the "sophisticated"
collective rights view, and the individualist view. The distinction between the first
two, according to Emerson, is that the former "merely recognizes the right of a state
to arm its militia"; whereas, the latter refers to a right that can only be exercised by
individuals when they are involved in a militia. See id. at 218-19. These two
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At the outset of its discussion, the Emerson court posited
that Miller is the only Supreme Court case that has offered any
ruling on the Second Amendment "as applied to the federal
government." 93 This assertion is at best misleading and at worst
wrong, as the court itself implicitly concedes. 94 In a footnote to
that comment, 95 the Emerson court mentioned the three earlier
Supreme Court cases discussed in a previous section of this
Article-Cruikshank,Presser, and Miller.9 6 The court dismissed
the relevance of all three, however, finding that "these holdings
all came well before the Supreme Court began the process of
incorporating certain provisions of the first eight amendments
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
meaning that "none of them establishes any principle governing
any of the issues now before us." 9 7
This assertion is flawed for three reasons. First, as the
earlier discussion of these three cases establishes, they all
directly address the meaning of the Second Amendment-a fact
which by itself contradicts the court's claim regarding their
irrelevance. Second, although Cruikshank dealt with alleged
violations of the Federal Enforcement Act of 1870, whereas
Presser and Miller pertained to violations of state laws in Illinois
and Texas, respectively, all three asserted that the Second
Amendment pertained only to the federal government. 98 Third,
to argue that these three cases are irrelevant because they were
decided before the Supreme Court began the process of
incorporation ignores or misunderstands how incorporation has
occurred-that is, as discussed earlier, 99 courts have
incorporated portions of the Bill of Rights selectively and on a
piecemeal basis. The fact that the Supreme Court has refused to
extend the incorporation principle to the Second Amendment
means simply and clearly that it continues to uphold its

perspectives are entirely consistent with each other, and the court gives no
justification for drawing out this difference; therefore, the proffered distinction
between collective and sophisticated collective is not examined further here. Rather,
the analysis of this Article is concerned with the court's individualist view.
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 221.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 221 n.13.
See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
Emerson, 270 F.3d at 221 n.13.
98 See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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decisions in Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller regarding this
subject. The mere fact that these three cases occurred before the
incorporation process began is not, in and of itself, a reason to
dismiss them. In fact, the Supreme Court expressly affirmed the
continued pertinence of these cases in the 1964 case of Malloy v.
Hogan.10 0 There the Court listed decisions where "particular
[Bill of Rights] guarantees were not safeguarded against state
action by the Privileges and Immunities Clause or other
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment" 1 1 and noted that the
Second Amendment is not incorporated. 0 2 This list included
both Cruikshank and Presser, affirming the conclusion that, at
least as of 1964, by which time the incorporation process had
largely occurred, 10 3 these two cases continued to be good law.
All of this takes on added importance when one considers in
particular the Supreme Court's decision in Presser, which
analyzed the Second Amendment purely as a right that connects
gun ownership with service in a government-organized and
regulated militia. In other words, the Presser decision flatly
contradicted the individualist interpretation of the Second
Amendment that the Emerson court attempted to advance. By
dismissing Presser as irrelevant, the Emerson court simply
dodged a case that squarely contradicted its assertions.
Further, the Emerson decision dwelled at length on the
federal government's brief in Miller.0 4 This itself is an odd turn,
since a court's authoritative voice and judgment is its rendered
opinion, not a brief presented by one party. Although courts
obviously draw on materials submitted in briefs to formulate
their conclusions, the Emerson court offered no reason why it felt
compelled to view Miller through the lens of the government's
brief.
Leaving this point aside, however, the Emerson court
asserted that the government's Miller brief consisted of two
arguments. The first argument asserted by the government
endorsed the militia-based or collective view of the Second
Amendment in opposition to the Emerson holding by
100 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
101 Id. at 4 n.2.
102

Id.

103

FISHER, supra note 32, at 428-29.

United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221-24 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).
104
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interpreting its language to secure the right to bear arms only
"'where the arms are borne in the militia or some other military
organization provided for by law and intended for the protection
of the state."'05 The second argument advanced by the
government, according to the Emerson court, was that the
sawed-off shotgun, the possession of which ran afoul of the 1934
National Firearms Act, was not "one of the 'Arms' that the
Second Amendment prohibits infringement of the right of the
people to keep and bear." 10 6 The Emerson court asserted that the
Supreme Court upheld Miller's and Layton's convictions because
of this so-called second argument1 7-that the weapon was not
one that would normally be used by a member of a militia, not
because the possessors were not part of a militia. According to
this argument, then, Miller "does not support the government's
collective rights ... approach to the Second Amendment." 0 8 The
Emerson majority continued: "Nor do we believe that any other
portion of the Miller opinion supports the ... collective rights
model." 10 9 In a final convolution, the Emerson court stated,
"[W]e do not proceed on the assumption that Miller actually
accepted an individual rights.., interpretation of the Second
Amendment." 110 Thus, after laboring to sever Miller from the
collective view that has been ascribed to it by over forty federal
courts and by dozens of law journal articles,"' the majority
decision betrayed its faith in its own analysis by saying that the
interpretation was irrelevant to its argument that the Second
Amendment supports an individual rights view.
Such an
assertion is surprising because the argument the court made
about Miller would support the direction in which the Emerson
majority tried to move the Second Amendment, although the
opinion later dragged Miller back in when it said that its
individualist holding was "consistent with Miller."11 2 Even so,
the very fact that this interpretation appeared in the text of a
federal court decision dealing with the highly charged subject of
gun control and the right to bear arms underscores that it is far
Id. at 222 (quoting brief in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)).
Id. at 224.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 226.
109 Id. at 225.
110 Id. at 226-27.
M See Spitzer, supra note 3, at 384-401; see also supra note 60.
112 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 260.
105
106
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For if the Emerson court is right in its
from irrelevant.
interpretation of Miller and everyone else is wrong it portends
an important readjustment in the thinking of courts and court
watchers that must arise in future Second Amendment cases. If
the analysis is defective, however, its defects warrant airing in
order to discourage their perpetuation.
VI. THE EMERSON ANALYSIS IS DEFECTIVE

Nowhere in the federal government's brief in the Miller case
does it say or imply that it is making two different arguments
about the meaning of the Second Amendment. Instead, what the
Emerson court refers to as two arguments is actually two parts
of a single argument designed to rebut the defendants' claims to
Second Amendment protections in order to vindicate the
constitutionality of the National Firearms Act of 1934.113
In its "Summary of Argument," the Justice Department brief
unequivocally states that:
The Second Amendment does not grant to the people the right
to keep and bear arms, but merely recognizes the prior
existence of that right and prohibits its infringement by
Congress.... the right to keep and bear arms has been
generally restricted to the keeping and bearing of arms by the
people collectively for their common defense and security.
Indeed, the very language of the Second Amendment discloses
that this right has reference only to the keeping and bearing of
arms by the people as members of the state114militia or other
similar military organization provided by law.
After thus articulating the militia-based understanding of
the Second Amendment, in the next sentence the government
specified the issue giving rise to the case-the regulation of
weapons used by criminals:
The "arms" referred to in the Second Amendment are,
moreover, those which ordinarily are used for military or public
defense purposes, and the cases unanimously hold that
weapons peculiarly adaptable to use by criminals are not within
the protection of the Amendment. 115

113 Id. at 221-23.
114

Brief for the United States, United States v. Miller.

115 Id.
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The next sentence addressed the Act:
The firearms referred to in the National Firearms Act, i.e.
sawed-off shotguns... clearly have no legitimate use in the
hands of private individuals but, on the contrary, frequently
constitute the arsenal of the gangster and the desperado. 116
The succeeding and final sentence in the Summary of
Argument linked the Second Amendment expressly to the
National Firearms Act of 1934 in order to argue that the latter
does not run afoul of the former:
Section 11, upon which the indictment was based, places
restrictions upon the transportation in interstate commerce of
weapons of this character only, and clearly, therefore,
constitutes no infringement of "the right of the people to keep
and bear arms," as that term is used in the Second
Amendment.117
Thus, the government's brief did not make two different
arguments, as the Emerson court asserted, but instead made a
single four-step argument: (1) the Second Amendment only
protects an individual's right to own a gun when that gun
ownership is related to collective defense and security as part of
militia service; (2) weapons to which criminals are especially
partial have long been recognized as beyond any Second
Amendment protection; 118 (3) the National Firearms Act of 1934
was expressly designed to regulate such "gangster weapons"; and
therefore, (4) the Act does not infringe on the Second
Amendment's right to bear arms.
The Emerson majority's desire to divorce the collective
militia view from the non-militia weapon argument is further
evinced by its observation that "nowhere in the Court's Miller
opinion is there any reference to the fact that the indictment
does not remotely suggest that either of the two defendants was

116

Id.

117

Id.

118 This argument was made several decades before Miller by Lucilius Emery in
the first extended analysis of the Second Amendment:
The constitutional guaranty of a right to bear arms does not include
weapons not usual or suitable for use in organized civilized warfare ...
and the carrying of such weapons may be prohibited. Only persons of
military capacity to bear arms in military organizations are within the
spirit of the guaranty.
Emery, supra note 26, at 476.
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ever a member of any organized, active militia." 119 The Emerson
court's inference is that this non-reference means that Miller did
not accept, or at least declined to endorse, the collective or
militia view of the Second Amendment.
Yet the Miller decision itself rebuts this assertion. First,
neither Miller nor Layton ever argued that they were members
of a militia, so there was no reason for the Court to note what
they did not argue. Second, the whole point of Miller and
Layton's defense was that the Second Amendment protected
their right to have the gun in question as civilians. Refutation of
this claim is the obvious reason why both the government's brief
and the Court's opinion devoted most of their text to analysis
related to government militias in the Constitution, history, and
law.
The Emerson decision found more broadly that no part of
Miller supported the collective or militia meaning of the Second
Amendment, stating that the Miller opinion "referred to the
generality of the civilian male inhabitants throughout their lives
from teenage years until old age and to their personally keeping
their own arms, and not merely to individuals during the time (if
any) they might be actively engaged in actual military
service." 120 Again, the Emerson court misunderstood the Miller
decision, as well as colonial and federal-era militias.
As the Court in Miller expressly provided, "[Tihe militia
system was based on the principle of the assize of arms. This
implied the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to
possess arms, and, with certain exceptions, to cooperate in the
work of defence."' 2 ' Yes, male inhabitants were obliged to obtain
weapons, but this did not somehow translate into a right of gun
ownership for personal purposes because the assertion of this
The
obligation was linked expressly to militia service.1 22
119 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 224 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002).

120 Id. at 226.

174, 179-80 (1939).
was indeed deeply concerned about militiaeligible citizens getting and keeping guns for collective defense purposes, given the
absence of a large standing American army and the government's difficulty in
ftmding the arming of its militias. The clearest statement of this concern was the
Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat 271 (1792), which required enrolled
militia members to provide their own weapons (therefore presupposing that they
obtain them on their own first) when called into service. Yet the law, along with
similar state measures, lacked mechanisms to enforce their terms. As a
121 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
122 The early American government
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Emerson court's misleading reference to "personally keeping
their own arms" 123 struggled to imply that personal gun
ownership was not necessarily linked to militias because citizens
might have guns and therefore have a Second-Amendment-based
right to have guns when they were not actually in the militia.
This assertion ignored the whole point-that the raison d'etre
was militia service, not personal or individual ownership for any
personal or individual purpose. If gun-owning citizens are not a
part of a militia or a contemplated militia-a contemplation that
must arise from the government, not from private citizens 124then there is no Second Amendment protection for such citizens
to claim.
Further, to say that the Second Amendment extends to a
citizen's right to own a gun, perhaps kept in the home or in some
other location so that the citizen will then be able to readily fetch
the weapon in an emergency necessitating militia call-up, is
essentially a variant of the collective/militia interpretationalbeit an obsolete one. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, this was indeed a means by which the general or
unorganized militia was designed to function. Yet, because this
system functioned so badly, 125 it was abandoned by the
government and eventually replaced with a nationwide military
draft whereby young men were funneled into an expanded
standing army instead of the general militia. 126 In the modern
American military, a soldier might also have occasion to
"personally keep" a gun, even though it would be military issue.
Yet such "personal keeping" would not somehow translate into a
personal right to own the gun for any personal purpose under
the Second Amendment. And as modern courts have noted,
Second Amendment rights come in to play only in the process of
"actual, as opposed to potential, organization, training, and

consequence, the laws were widely ignored. See SPITZER, supra note 16, at 28-32.
123 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 226.
12 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886).
125 The effective death knell of the old-style militia system was the disastrous
War of 1812, in which militias performed abysmally. See LAWRENCE DELBERT
CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS 172-77 (1982); MILLETT & MASLOWSKI, supra note 21, at
129-130; Weiner, supra note 26, at 188-89.
126 For more on the shift from militia to draft, beginning with the Civil War, see
David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional
Change, 99 MICH. L. REv. 588 (2000).
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equipping of the... unorganized militia."1 27 The old militia
system's insistence that citizens obtain guns for militia use
brought together two behaviors-gun acquisition and militia
service-that the Emerson majority wished to pretend were
entirely separate for purposes of the Second Amendment. Yet
that wish is unsupported in the Emerson case and it is at odds
with the actual history of militias in America. Since Americans
are no longer obliged to keep firearms for militia service, given
that such service no longer occurs, the Emerson court failed to
establish an individualist Second Amendment-based right
grounded in Miller or elsewhere.
In a final stab at buttressing its claim, the Emerson court
provided a quote from the 1980 Supreme Court case Lewis v.
United States128 which, as discussed earlier, embraced the
militia-based understanding of the Second Amendment,
specifically citing Miller in the process. 129 After quoting the
relevant portion of the government's brief cited in Lewis, the
Emerson court stated, "This does not suggest a collective
rights.., approach to the Second Amendment any more than
does Miller itself."130 Nowhere is this assertion explained, other
than to assert that it is so and that it is consistent with Miller.
Yet the wording cited in Lewis, as previously quoted, plainly
articulated and embraced the collective or militia view in its
express declaration that "the Second Amendment guarantees no
right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 'some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia.'"131 These words express the antithesis of the
individualist view expounded in Emerson. The Emerson court's
defective reading of Miller hardly excuses its misrepresentation
of Lewis.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Emerson is paradoxical not only for
its misreading of the Miller decision and the federal
127 United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 1997), affd in part
on reh'g and vacated in part on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998).
128 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
129 Emerson, 270 F.3d at 226 n.21.
130

Id.

131Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178

(1939)).
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government's brief in Miller but also for the very fact that it
chose to venture into this territory. If one fact is clear from the
opinion, it is that the Emerson majority's ill-conceived foray into
Second Amendment interpretation was irrelevant to the court's
holding. Moreover, the Emerson court's treatment of the Second
Amendment is singular for its distorted view of the right to bear
arms. This Article's conclusion is unequivocal: in prior rulings
on the meaning of the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court
and over forty lower federal court rulings are correct in
embracing the collective or militia view of the amendment. The
Emerson majority, by comparison, fails to dislodge the formers'
reasoning or conclusions. Despite this conclusion, however, the
political and legal forces bent on remaking the Second
Amendment will no doubt persist.
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